Pentagon papers leak sensitive documents scanned

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Fuck biden

Unread post by Fuck biden » 2023-4-28 12:19

Pentagon papers

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Download

Download the whole package here: https://anonfiles.com/Qfff71l9zf/2023_March_Pentagon_docs_zip

Some OCR'd texts

(TS//SI//OC/NF) SYRIA: ISIS SENIOR LEADER KILLED IN SYRIA
On 24 February, ISIS senior leader and global administrator Abu Sara was reportedly killed in Syria. Abu Sara led ISIS's General Directorate of Provinces and influenced its strategy, personnel assignments, and most sensitive global operations. J2 Assessment: Abu Sara's removal very likely will disrupt ISIS's global cohesion, security, and financial transfers for at least the next 3 months. ISIS likely will rely on its archived institutional knowledge and a new leadership cadre who lack extensive relationships with the group's legacy senior leaders.
(DIA Intel Update, 28 Feb)
RUSSIA, EUROPE, & EURASIA
(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) RUSSIA/MOLDOVA/TURKEY: PLANNING FOR DESTABILIZATION OF MOLDOVA CONTINUES
At least some figures behind Russian plotting against Moldova intend to continue their efforts despite recent public revelations about their activities. The general director of the Russian private military company Vegacy Strategy Services coordinated with an employee of Vagner- linked influence group, "The Farm," in mid-February to adjust their planning for likely
destabilization activities in Moldova.
The organizers originally planned to hold protest training in Turkey from 24 to 28 February but changed the location to an unspecified special training center in Russia because of travel restrictions and Turkish intelligence attention on Russian males. They also extended the total training time to one to two months.
The employees said that more than 150 participants would attend the protest training, which would include lessons on starting protests, security service reaction to riots, first aid, and psychological training for what to do if caught. (Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)
(S//NF) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: BATTLEFIELD UPDATE
Russian forces made minor territorial gains around Bakhmut yesterday and continued to press Ukrainian forces elsewhere in the region, even as Ukraine expanded its access to key supply lines running westward out of the city. Separately, Russia conducted one-way UAV attacks against targets near Kyiv and Zhytomyr-all of which Ukraine claimed it intercepted-and against a Ukrainian military unit in western Ukraine, which killed two and injured three. (Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)


(TS//SI//NF) CHINA: PROBABLY DEVELOPING CYBER Attack CAPABILITIES
THAT WILL THREATEN WESTERN SATELLITE SYSTEMS
The IC assesses China is developing cyber-attack capabilities to deny, exploit, and hijack satellite links and networks as part of its strategy to control information, which it considers a key warfighting domain. China's ability to infiltrate a core network or mimic a specific command link could allow it to seize control of a satellite, rendering it ineffective to support communications, weapons, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. (CIA-DA-IA-2023-01779)


TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA
upcoming preparatory meeting in March. Finally, Bibang Nchuchuma observed that Africa has "turned into a pretty girl with many suitors" with the U.S. and the West wanting to win over the "pretty girl."
(U) 3/IR/120965-23
(U) LATIN AMERICA
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
Colombian President Signs Cease-Fire Protocols Decree for Peace Talks With FARC-EP (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Colombian President Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego as of mid-February signed the cease-fire protocols, which would facilitate peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP), though capture orders for the planned FARC-EP attendees remained in place. The FARC-EP's planned attendees remained on standby to relay their pick-up coordinates, though would continue moving to avoid death or capture until the capture orders were lifted and the signed cease-fire protocols were initiated. Meanwhile, the FARC-EP and the Colombian Armed Forces (COLAR) each claimed the other organization violated the cease-fire initiative and sought to meet in Cauca Department, Colombia to present evidence of the violations. The Colombian Ministry of Defense also initiated an investigation into an incident that occurred in Puerto Rico, Argelia, Cauca, which almost certainly involved the FARC-EP and the COLAR. The FARC-EP Western Joint Command (WJC) as of mid-February also persisted in attacking unidentified targets, switching from engaging in open-combat to conducting small raids. The switch in tactics resulted in multiple successful raids. The WJC also intended to solicit evidence from the local populace to prove their allegations that the COLAR collaborated with the FARC-Segunda Marquetalia and the National Liberation Army to attack the FARC-EP. (U) 3/05/121275-23
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
GRULAC Invited to Meet With PRC Official Regarding Strategic Partnership in Latin America (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) UN Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) member representatives in China were invited to meet with PRC Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Tang Renjian in late March to discuss China's strategic partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean. Uruguayan Ambassador to China Fernando Lugris on 22 February informed GRULAC representatives that Tang planned to meet with any interested GRULAC representatives on 27 March. The purpose of the meeting was for GRULAC representatives to better understand Tang's views on China's strategic cooperative partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean, especially on matters related to agricultural cooperation. The meeting was scheduled to take place at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. As of 27 February, there was no indication as to which GRULAC member representatives, if any, accepted the invitation to attend the event. (U) 3/OT/121407-23


(U//FOUO) CIA Operations Center Intelligence Update
TOP SECRET/ISI/SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA
This version of CIA Operations Center Intelligence Update is from 04:42. 2 March 2023
How to print this Update
Russia: Defense Officials Contemplate Responses to Prigozhin's Claim of Not Receiving Munitions (TS//SI-G/OC/REL FVEY) (TS//SI-G/OC/REL FVEY) Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials as of late February considered possible actions to counter Vagner owner Prigozhin's public accusations that the MOD was not supplying munitions to his troops in Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report. Defense officials noted Prigozhin's allegations could be legitimate and proposed doubling munitions supplied to Vagner forces followed by a public statement.
120/00/121475-23)
Russia, Haiti: Vagner Seeks Possible Security Contracts With Port-au-Prince (SINF/DSEN)
(S//NF/DSEN) Vagner associates as of late February planned to discreetly travel to Hati to assess the potential for contracts with the Haitian Government to fight against local gangs, according to a law enforcement report DEA-NN-IIR-3608-23)
Hungary, US: Budapest Identifies Washington as Adversary (C/NF)
(C//NF) Hungarian Prime Minister Orban on 22 February identified the US as one of his party's top three adversaries during a political strategy session, according to the US Embassy in Budapest. Comment: Orban's Inclusion of the US in his list of top three adversaries constitutes an escalation of the level of anti-American rhetoric in his discourse. (23 BUDAPEST 51)
Iran: Tehran Prepares for Early March SLV Launch (TS/SI/REL FVEY)
(TS//SV/REL FVEY) The IRGC Aerospace Force as of 28 February is was likely preparing to launch a Gha'em-100 space launch vehicle (SLV) equipped with a Nahid-1 satellite probably in early March, according to a signals intelligence report and imagery analysis (3/00/121457-23)(CA0045) Iran: IAEA Rescinds Tehran's Voting Rights, Director To Visit Tehran for Enrichment Discussions (TS/SU/REL FVEY/FISA)
(TS//SV/REL FVEY/FISA) The IAEA as of late February informed Tehran it lost voting rights at the IAEA for 2023 due to errors in contributions in 2021 and 2022 and required Tehran to pay a sum more than $1.4 million to restore its voting rights, according to a signals intelligence report. Separately, IAEA Director


TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//O
that Ruto was ruthless and that she did not trust him. Guterres maintained that the DRC needed a small number of was good and that Ruto was smart but demanding of Tshisekedi, which Guterres believed was necessary. The DSG retorted Guterres indicated that involving former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta was unavoidable. professional special forces units to fight effectively. As for negotiating a cease-fire, Guterres saw himself as an the future. On Kenya, Guterres indicated that he had a good discussion with the Kenyans and believed that the issue of denying Guterres' planned trip to the Tigray region. Abiy apparently extended an invitation to Guterres to visit Tigray in intermediary. For Ethiopia, Guterres acknowledged that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali apologized to him for fertilizers, likely meaning Russian fertilizer exports to Africa, and Kenya was resolved. Finally, on Russia and Ukraine, Guterres was dismayed at EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's announcement on the need for Europe to produce more weapons and ammunition, presumably as a result of the conflict in Ukraine.
(U) Z-G/00/121288-23
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
DRC ANR Official Assesses DRC Split From EAC, Suspects EAC of Destabilization Plot (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) National Intelligence Agency (ANR) Deputy Provincial Director in South Kivu Province Kwalezitome Lilungi Dodo in mid-February assessed that the East Africa Community (EAC) were complicit in the balkanization of the DRC, especially with reported inaction from Kenyan contingents of the EAC Regional Force (EACRF) among other events that have resulted in the EAC reportedly losing the trust of the DRC population. Lilungi believed the DRC should address the aggression by Rwanda and the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group without including other EAC members. Lilungi on 13 February noted that DRC citizens acknowledged that the EACRF's Kenyan contingent hesitated to take military action against the M23. Lilungi assessed that the Kenyan contingents ignored the recommendations from the Nairobi dialogues between the DRC government and local armed groups, which stipulated that regional forces would be deployed to control and combat any aggression within the DRC. Lilungi argued there was no excuse for the delay in applying the resolutions while instead establishing buffer zones where DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) would be denied entry. Lilungi declared these zones to be contrary to Nairobi Process recommendations. Lilungi recalled that DRC President Felix Tshisekedi declared in a recent speech that only Congolese could help the Congolese against Rwanda and the M23. Lilungi further argued that the DRC needed to expel the Kenyan and Ugandan People's Defense Forces troops whom he assessed were working as part of the destabilization plot against the DRC; this would leave the Congolese to resolve this issue alone. (COMMENT: Lilungi has been an advocate of increasing the DRC's aggressiveness against M23 and Rwandan incursions into the DRC. Lilungi initially recommended using Mai-Mai armed groups and other rebels against M23 and Rwandan Defense Forces to overthrow Rwandan President Paul Kagame in late January. Lilungi almost certainly views the international community's presence in eastern DRC as a hindrance to the DRC's ability to provide security as the international community would disapprove of the DRC working with Mai-Mai groups. Lilungi was almost certainly insisting that the DRC should seek to expedite the departure of all international forces so that the DRC could handle its own security or consider other international partners for military support.)
(U) 3/00/121204-23
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Equatoguinean Official Stresses Importance of Security in Advance of Russia-Africa Summit (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Equatorial Guinea's Minister of External Security Juan Antonio Bibang Nchuchuma stressed the importance of security as a theme for an upcoming preparatory meeting in advance of the July Russia-Africa Summit, and assessed that Russian security training was of a higher quality than that of the West, according to mid-February information. Equatoguinean Ambassador to Russia Luciano Ncogo Ndong Ayecaba on 11 February notified Bibang Russia-Africa Summit were food security, energy security, public health issues, and human resources training. Bibang Nchuchuma surmised that food security was a product of energy security, which in turn was linked to the human resources issue and was therefore tied to the overall security of the African continent. Bibang Nchuchuma also noted that Russia was stirred up by the West to pressure African regimes. Moreover, Bibang Nchuchuma added that security training and the U.S. were currently caught up in a "concurrent fight" in Africa due to the terrorism situation, which he believed compared to the West due to its experience with training special counterterrorism units. As such, Ndong Ayecaba differed between Russia and the West, specifically calling out the Russian Special Forces training system as a higher-quality suggested that Equatorial Guinea add a fifth theme of fighting the neocolonialism of Western countries in Africa to the




Bakhmut Topographic Tactical Map As of 01 0600 EST Mar 2023
Bakhmut Axis
UAF: 12 BOES
0-370
Kramatorsk
Bakhmut Axis
RF:35 Total MVR BNs "29,000 Total Russian Personnel
7,000 Regular/Res, RLF, and TDF -22,000 PMC Vagner
10 Combat-Effective MVR BNS (regular and reserve) Combat-Ineffective MVR BNS (regular and reserve)
15 Combat-Effective RLF BNS
10 Combat-Ineffective RLF BNS
0 Combat-Effective TDF BNS Combat-Ineffective TDF BNS
12 Vagner PMC DETS
UAF: 12 BDES 161 MVR ENG) 15.250
Chaser
Blahodatne
TOP SECRET//HOS-P
/RSEN/ORCON/NOFORN
Distances Bakhmutske to Soledar: "4 km (2.5 mi) Soledar to Krasna Hora: 5 km (3 mi)
Krasna Hora to Bakhmut: "8 km (5 mi)
Bakhmut to Chasiv Yar: "12 km (7.5 m)
.
.
Soledar to Siversk: "20 km (12 mi)
. Siversk to Lyman: "25 km (15 mi)
.
Chasiv Yar to Kramatorsk: 25 km (15 mi) Krasna Hora to Sloviansk: "35 km (22 m) Bakhmut to Kramatorsk: "30 km (18.5mij
7-46-13
Sil
Krasna Hora
Pidhorodne
Soledar
501
Bakhmutske
0-0506
Bakhmut
502
anivske
Opytne
DO
8
Klyshchivka
Ukraine Bakht Area
Pg 58




J) NEAR EAST
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Huthi Spokesman Receives Update on Saudi Negotiating Positions
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Huthi spokesman Muhammad Abd-al-Salam in mid-February received an update on Saudi negotiating positions with the Huthis. This update included directives from Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Muhammad Al Jabir to examine two options for the payment of Yemeni salaries that would exclude paying Huthi military salaries. The first option would be to pay public sector salaries based on the 2014 rosters for both Huthi- and Republic of Yemen- controlled areas for 2 months during the initial phase of a cease-fire agreement. The rest of the employees would receive payment during the "second phase," and these payments would begin during the fourth month of sovereign state revenues. For the second option, the Saudis could pay half of the salaries of public sector employees based on the 2014 budget during the initial phase. Once the Joint Economic Steering Committee completed determining Yemeni sovereign revenues and its review of employee rosters, full salary payments would be provided for all employees. Abd-al-Salam learned that because the Saudis expected the Huthis to make additional demands regardless of what proposal the Saudis presented to them, the Saudis were preparing a variety of different options for the proposal. A Huthi intelligence source apparently assessed that if the Huthis issued a "strong statement," it would increase pressure on the Saudis, as the Saudis intended to drag out negotiations and avoid making firm commitments. The consultant warned that the Huthis' patience was "misunderstood," and that the Saudis hoped to gradually decrease Huthi demands based on the belief that the Huthis were under pressure and in need of a détente on humanitarian issues before the beginning of Ramadan on 22 March. (U) 3/00/121184-23
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Jordanian Government Officials, Orange Telecommunications Representatives Discuss 5G Bids (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) A Jordanian Royal Hashemite Court official exchanged updates on 26 February with a representative from the Orange Jordan telecommunications company on the status of Orange Jordan's selection of a provider for its rollout of 5G infrastructure in Jordan. According to the Orange Jordan representative, the bids they received from Ericsson and Nokia were $61 to $62 million higher than the bid they received from Chinese technology company Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Furthermore, Nokia had not bridged the gap in bids for Orange Jordan as it had reportedly done for Jordanian telecommunications provider Zain. A likely Jordanian intelligence official was working to reduce the bid disparity and negotiate compensation with Ericsson and Nokia. The Orange Jordan representative remained optimistic that the disparity in bids could be reduced and that a solution would be found. Additionally, Jordanian government officials met the previous week to form a task force to handle matters related to the 5G bids, and additional meetings took place with the participation of the Jordanian Minister of Justice and the Jordanian Telecommunications Regulatory Commission to discuss the legal framework of related matters. The Orange CEO planned to meet with Ericsson
representatives in Spain later that week.
(U) 3/55/121356-23
(U) AFRICA
(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA)
UN Secretary-General Revels in Successful AU Summit
(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in mid-February reveled in what he considered a successful AU Summit. Guterres on 19 February updated the UN Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) on his perceived successes with and the DSG conversed about Africa and the Americas, the EU, Ukraine, Russia, Syria, Afghanistan, the G20, and climate regards to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, and Kenya, among other issues. In addition, Guterres DRC President Felix Tshisekedi. Guterres claimed that Tshisekedi loved his presentation to the AU Peace and Security change. Regarding the DRC, Guterres claimed that he managed to reconcile the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC and Council, which Guterres followed up with separate meetings with Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Kenyan President William Ruto to further advance discussions on the DRC. Guterres added that Tshisekedi trusted Angolan President Joao Lourenco, but that Tshisekedi did not trust Ruto. Tshisekedi apparently wanted the mediation to be led by Angola but




(U) RUSSIA
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Russian PMC Vagner Officials Pursue Weapons Procurements from Turkey, Belarus, PRC, Syria (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company (PMC) Vagner arranged in early February for a meeting between Vagner personnel and Turkish contacts to coordinate the purchase of Turkish weapons and equipment, likely for use in Mali, Ukraine, or both. Vagner coordinated with Turkish contacts to send five affiliates to Ankara, Turkey, seeking to obtain UAVS (including quadcopters), EW systems, counter-battery systems, howitzer artillery, and optical instruments. Vagner's Turkish contacts revealed the inability to export some requested weapons and equipment, such as howitzers, counter- battery systems, and certain unspecified counter-drone weapons. According to Prigozhin affiliates, Malian Transition President Assimi Goita was involved in efforts to acquire weapons from Turkey for Vagner's interests. Additionally, Vagner personnel sought munitions and equipment in early 2023 from Belarus, the PRC, and Syria. Belarus already delivered 50 percent of unspecified weapons promised as of early January and offered in late January to send 300,000 VOG-17 grenade launcher rounds. The PRC had not sent Vagner any weapons, not even for testing, and had no contact with Vagner regarding weapons deliveries as of early January. Finally, Vagner purchased six SPG-9 grenade launchers and 180 grenades in Syria on Prigozhin's orders, but personnel were uncertain where they would be sent beyond Syria.
(U) 3/00/121157-23
(U) CHINA
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
PRC Foreign Affairs Officials Characterize International Reaction to HAB Incident as Impartial (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) PRC foreign affairs officials in February characterized the international community's reaction to the high-altitude balloon (HAB) incident as impartial and advised PRC diplomatic missions to counter perceived U.S. efforts to escalate the issue and influence public opinion. Although some countries reportedly took sides regarding the incident, the officials indicated that countries generally were more concerned about the stability of the PRC-U.S. relationship, which the international community allegedly criticized as being weak. The officials maintained that the HAB was a civilian air vehicle that did not pose a threat and that the U.S. response was an overreaction, claiming that the U.S. sought to sensationalize the incident to undermine the PRC. To prevent this, the foreign affairs officials recommended that PRC diplomatic missions clarify the alleged facts of the incident, expose U.S. hypocrisy by citing instances of U.S. surveillance operations, and highlight the impact of domestic U.S. politics on the U.S. response to the HAB.
(U) G/O0/121516-23
German MoD Rejects Deeper Cooperation With PRC Until PRC Becomes More Transparent (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) The German Federal Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Policy Directorate on 20 February hosted Defense Staff Talks with its PRC counterpart in Berlin. The Chief of the German MoD's Policy Division responsible for defense relations with the PRC asserted that Germany and the PRC agreed to hold another joint seminar at the German Federal Academy of Security Policy in Berlin and to work toward cooperative military assistance in support of the UN. The Germans, however, made clear to the PRC delegation that no further defense cooperation would be possible until Beijing the face of heavy U.S. pressure, and the Germans believed that they maintained solidarity with the U.S. by refusing more significant defense cooperation with the PRC. Separately, the German MoD sought to establish similar Staff Talks with the
Indian MoD between 2020 and 2022, but to no avail.
(U) 3/00/121295-23


TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)
Russian Officials Consider Response to Mogul Prigozhin's Public Accusations Regarding Munitions (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Following a slew of public accusations from Russian mogul Yevgeniy Prigozhin in which he claimed his private military company (PMC) Vagner forces in Ukraine were not receiving munitions from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), MOD officials in mid- to late February were considering what actions to take in response. The officials initially noted that, if the MOD was going to try to counter Prigozhin's public statements, they should find allies of equal status to fight Prigozhin rather than doing so itself; however, they were ultimately unsure how the MoD could successfully fight an information war with Prigozhin if the Russian government did not forbid Prigozhin from making public releases. The MOD officials also noted they could not decisively say whether or not Vagner was receiving munitions, acknowledging that Prigozhin's claims could be legitimate. They noted that Vagner's munitions were not distributed directly from the MOD but instead through the Grouping of Troops (Forces) in Bakhmut, Ukraine. Some MoD officials eventually proposed doubling the munitions supply to Vagner and then release public messaging of that fact. Later, Vagner affiliate Vladislav Andriyevskiy on 22 February indicated that Prigozhin was called into a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, presumably that day. (COMMENT: The meeting almost certainly concerned, at least in part, Prigozhin's public accusations and resulting tension with Shoygu.) Separately, Federal Security Service officials in late February determined that Vagner's requests for munitions were fulfilled-though not in full-through 11 February; however, on 12 February Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov reportedly ordered a stop to munitions supplies for Vagner and also to planned military transport flights, which were set to transport munitions
designated for Vagner to Rostov-na-Donu, Russia.
(U) G/00/121475-23
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Russian Embassy in Austria Officials Claim U.S. Preventing Peace Talks in Ukraine
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Aleksandr Zhuravlev, deputy director of the Russian Science and Culture Center in Austria and a second secretary at the Russian Embassy in Austria, made light of the Austrian government's decision to expel four Russian officials in early February and claimed the U.S. was preventing peace talks in Ukraine. Zhuravlev on 18 February noted that he agreed with the lighthearted assessment of his colleague, Moscow-based Sergey Sorokin, that the Austrian expulsion of four Russian officials met the Austrian expulsion quota for the year. Sorokin recalled that Austria also expelled four Russians in 2022. Zhuravlev reported that he believed Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Schalenberg was "scrutinizing" the Russians in Austria. He also reported rumors that stated the conflict in Ukraine reached a point where Ukraine and Russia decided to "forget it," put things on hold, and negotiate, but that "the Americans" were not allowing anyone to talk with the Russians. Zhuravlev and Sorokin also noted that the exchange rate for U.S. dollars (USDS) on the black market in Russia was not terrible since one could buy $1.00 for between 77 and 80 Russian rubles (between $1.05 and $1.09). Official bank rates were apparently not as favorable and USDS were hard to find in Moscow.
(U) 3/Z1/121393-23
(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA)
SBU Chairman Claims Strike on Russian A-50 Aircraft in Belarus Conducted By Belarusian Opposition (TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Chairman Vasyl Malyuk in late February claimed that although the SBU wanted to strike a Russian A-50 AWACS in Belarus, possibly an SBU agent in Belarus conducted the strike on 26 February despite Malyuk's order not to do so. Malyuk was initially planning to strike the aircraft with an anti-missile system, but instead delivered combat UAVS to the area, noting that SBU had an agent there. He assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak prior to the strike that, if no Belarusians were harmed, the strike would be seen as legitimate sabotage directed at the Russians. Zelenskyy and Yermak, however, were concerned that an SBU strike would give Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka a reason to join Russia's war against Ukraine. After the aircraft was struck, Malyuk claimed that it was an agent in Belarus-possibly the SBU agent Malyuk previously referenced-who decided on his own to strike the aircraft. Malyuk assured Zelenskyy and Yermak that the SBU was ordered not to strike it and likely could not be connected to the strike.
(U) Z-G/00/121322-23


(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) BURKINA FASO/COTE D'IVOIRE/MALI/ RUSSIA: ABIDJAN ASSESSES THREAT OF VAGNER PRESENCE ACROSS BORDER; VAGNER STRENGTH IN MALI GROWS
On 13 February, an Ivoirian Ministry of Interior and Security official assessed Russian private military company Vagner could use its presence in Burkina Faso and Mali to destabilize Cote d'Ivoire, according to signals intelligence. Separately, on 26 February, a Vagner employee reported to an associate the total number of Vagner contractors located in Mali had risen to 1,645. (CIA Intel Update, 28 Feb; 3/50/120952-23; 3/50/121089-23)
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
(S//NF) BOLIVIA: PRESIDENT WEAKENING DEMOCRACY
President Luis Arce is sidelining human rights observers, imprisoning opposition figures, and manipulating the timing of Bolivia's census to consolidate his political power and prevent competitive elections, accelerating democratic erosion in the country. Arce, who was handpicked by party heavyweight former President Morales, garnered support from his own faction within the Movement Toward Socialism and is probably taking these steps to shore up the party's dominance before elections in October 2025. Arce may be willing to curb future attempts to neuter the opposition if the US pressed him or Brazilian President Lula reached out to him, but Arce would probably resist reversing the steps he has already taken.
(WIRE2023-02046)
CYBER
(S//NF) CHINA: SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN DOD SUPPLY CHAINS Chinese state-owned video surveillance equipment maker Hikvision, which partners with Chinese intelligence entities, is using relationships with resellers to disguise its products for sale to government suppliers, which probably is creating vectors for Beijing to compromise DoD networks. This is consistent with DIA's October 2019 assessment that Hikvision products- banned by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act-probably would persist in DoD supply chains because of the company's efforts to mask its exports to retain access to US and allies' markets. As of January 2023, white-labeled Hikvision products were still available to US.
Government customers. (DIA F 24NYHA)


(U//FOUO) The below information is current as of 1200 ET/1700Z.
(U) RUSSIA/UKRAINE
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)
Russian GOU Provides Targeting Information for Oil Storage Facility for Potential Strikes (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian 3rd Directorate, Main Operations Directorate on 27 February provided targeting information for an oil storage facility and Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) equipment in Krivyi Rih, Ukraine that would be potentially struck on an unspecified date. The provided targeting information included the oil storage facility as well as UAF equipment located nearby. Additionally, a Russian Ministry of Defense official requested orders, further reconnaissance, and that the target coordinates be relayed to the Battlefield Command Group to destroy the target. (U) G/RG/121340-23
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)
Russian GOU Reports Successful Operational Masking Operations in Belarus Against Ukraine 5//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian Main Operations Directorate (GOU) reported successful operational masking forts in Belarus against Ukraine between 3 and 10 February. The officials claimed they successfully convinced Ukrainian Intelligence services of the possibility of a joint Russian-Belarusian offensive to occur from Belarusian territory. A Russian GOU official based this conclusion on a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service report on Ukrainian reactions to the deployment of Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army units to airfields in Belarus, layering of air defense systems, transfer of Iskander-M divisions to Belarus and changing the focus of training activities from defensive to offensive. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reportedly considered the rotation of Russian military units and subunits of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (MSD) 1st Tank Army with the 6th MSD 3rd Army Corps as an attempt to covertly prepare combat-ready groups for rapid deployment in the Volynsk axis to disrupt support from Western countries. The Russian GOU recommended two phases of activity to further mislead Ukrainian forces about the possibility of offensive operations from Belarusian territory. The first phase would last until 6 March and the second from 6 to 11 March and plans for the two phases were
being sent to the Belarusian Chief of General Staff for approval.
(U) G/00/121249-23
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Russian PMC Vagner to Resume Recruitment, Seek Medical Services for Project 42174 Prisoners of prisoners for Project 42174, which is an ongoing Vagner effort to recruit, train, and integrate Russian convicts into (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company (PMC) Vagner planned in mid-February to resume its recruitment Vagner units operating in Ukraine. Additionally, senior Vagner members would be dispatched to 70 prisoner unidentified distribution points in support of these efforts; meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense was reportedly recalling its own recruiters from these locations. This planning occurred in tandem with attempts by senior Vagner members to address the disparities between the treatment of Vagner contractors wounded-in-action (WIA) and Project 42174 fighters WIA. Senior Vagner officials continued to advocate for equal treatment in regard to medical services rendered, while also updating the terms of the Project 42174 contracts to better address issues related to the WIA.
(U) 3/00/121297-23


(TS//SI//NF) CHINA: PROBABLY DEVELOPING CYBER Attack CAPABILITIES
THAT WILL THREATEN WESTERN SATELLITE SYSTEMS
The IC assesses China is developing cyber-attack capabilities to deny, exploit, and hijack satellite links and networks as part of its strategy to control information, which it considers a key warfighting domain. China's ability to infiltrate a core network or mimic a specific command link could allow it to seize control of a satellite, rendering it ineffective to support communications, weapons, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. (CIA-DA-IA-2023-01779)


(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: FSB CLAIMS DEFENSE MINISTRY
UNDERREPORTING RUSSIAN CASUALTIES
Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) accused the Defense Ministry of obfuscating Russian casualties in Ukraine, highlighting the continuing reluctance of military officials to convey bad news up the chain of command. On 21 February, FSB officials claimed the Defense Ministry was leader Kadyrov's mercenaries, and other unofficial organizations. They calculated the actual number of Russians wounded and killed in action was closer to 110,000.
The combination of high casualties, particularly along the Bakhmut axis, and inability to recruit more prisoners will probably force Vagner to draw down offensive operations after its eventual capture of Bakhmut.
Vagner remains barred from restarting its recruiting of Russian prisoners and the company continues to struggle to replace losses via other recruitment pipelines. (Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)
(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) RUSSIA/BELARUS/UKRAINE: SBU CHAIRMAN CLAIMS BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION CONDUCTED STRIKE ON RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT As of 27 February, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Chairman Malyuk claimed that, although the SBU had wanted to strike a Russian A-50 AWACS in Belarus, Belarusian partisans conducted the strike. Malyuk assured Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and Presidential Office Chief of Staff Yermak prior to the strike that, if no Belarusian was harmed, the strike would be seen as legitimate sabotage directed at the Russians. Zelenskyy and Yermak, however, were concerned an SBU strike would give Belarusian President Lukashenka a reason to join Russia's war against Ukraine. After the aircraft was struck, Malyuk claimed a local Belarusian opposition figure
decided on his own to strike the aircraft. (Z-G/00/121322-23)
(TS//HCS-P/SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: NATIONAL GUARD
PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IMPEDE OCCUPATION PLANS
Russian National Guard personnel shortfalls in Ukraine will probably hinder Moscow's attempts to fully secure all of its annexed territories. In August, the Russian National Guard had at least 27,500 troops in Ukraine and has since suffered significant personnel losses. National Guard units have taken on numerous additional missions to hold territory behind the frontline of Russian forces in Ukraine, amplifying their personnel needs. (WIRE2023-01665)


(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) RUSSIA: UN SECRETARY GENERAL ACCOMMODATING RUSSIA TO PRESERVE GRAIN DEAL
UN Secretary General Guterres is taking steps to accommodate Russia in an effort to protect the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which he considers a pivotal UN success and key to addressing global food insecurity, and his actions are undermining broader efforts to hold Moscow accountable for its actions in Ukraine. In early February, he urged Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in a letter to renew the BSGI before its term expires on 18 March and Guterres emphasized his efforts to improve Russia's ability to export, even if that involves sanctioned Russian entities or individuals, according to FISA-derived signal intelligence. (WIRE2023-00815)
(S//NF) EU/UK: REACH AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND The agreement between the European Commission and the UK Government yesterday to modify the contentious Northern Ireland Protocol paves the way for improved relations between the UK and the EU, but it might fall short of restoring the Northern Ireland Executive. UK Prime Minister Sunak and European Commission President von der Leyen agreed to the Windsor Framework, which includes easing customs and regulatory checks on some goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and creating a greater role for the Northern Ireland government to weigh in on changes to EU laws affecting Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party leader Jeffrey Donaldson is probably inclined to accept the agreement, but hardliners in his party may hold him back. If the Democratic Unionist Party rejects the framework, the UK Government will probably call new elections in Northern Ireland-in the hope that moderate unionist voters punish Democratic Unionist Party intransigence-rather than jeopardize the agreement with the EU. (EU-UK EU, 28 Feb)
AFRICA
(U//FOUO) NIGERIA: INEC ANNOUNCES LEAD FOR RULING PARTY CANDIDATE, CONTINUES VOTE COUNTING
On 27 February, Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) continued counting votes from the 25 February presidential election and said so far ruling party candidate Tinubu had won 3.8 million votes and six states, opposition candidate Atiku had won 3 million votes and five states, and candidate Obi had won 1.6 million votes and three states, according to OSE reporting. Additionally, Tinubu publicly accepted his loss of Lagos State, where he had been governor from 1999 to 2007, to Obi. (CIA Intel Update, 28 Feb; EUW2023022805090399)


(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) An Ivoirian Ministry of Interior and Security official on 13 February assessed Russian private military company Vagner could use its presence in Burkina Faso and Mali to destabilize Cote d'Ivoire, according to a signals intelligence report. Separately, a Vagner employee on 26 February reported to an associate the total number of Vagner contractors located in Mali had risen to 1,645, according to a signals intelligence report. [6](3/50/120952-23)[7]
(3/50/121089-23)
Belarus, Russia, Turkey: Turkish Companies Helped Minsk Evade Sanctions on Russian Trade (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Turkish trade attache in Belarus in October and November 2022 reported that Turkish companies purchased sanctioned goods from Belarus and sold them in European markets, resold goods from Europe to Russia, and used certain banks to mitigate the effects of Turkey's placement on the Financial Action Task Force grey list, according to a signals intelligence report. [8](3/00/121111-23)
Israel, Turkey: Ankara Supports Bilateral Relations, Energy Cooperation With Jerusalem (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Turkish President Erdogan in mid-February stated Ankara would work with Israel to transfer Israeli natural gas to Europe, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, Erdogan encouraged collaboration between the two countries' foreign ministries.[9](3/00/121022-23)
China, Jordan: Amman Attempts Damage Control After 5G Rollout Causes Friction With Huawei, Beijing (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late February planned to assure Beijing that Amman wanted to continue their economic relationship after Beijing had reportedly complained Chinese companies were excluded from Jordan's 5G rollout, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, two of the three major Jordanian telecommunications operators had already eliminated Huawei from consideration.[10](3/55/120969-23)


NEAR EAST
(S//NF) ISRAEL/PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: VIOLENCE INTENSIFIES Ongoing unrest in the West Bank will probably continue to intensify and put at risk an agreement the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority reached in Al 'Aqabah, Jordan, on 26 February to reduce tension. After the parties signed the agreement-which included commitments to deescalate and address key issues, including Israeli unilateral raids into the West Bank-Israeli settlers attacked Huwwarah village near Nablus in the northern West Bank in response to a Palestinian killing two Israelis there earlier that day. On 27 February, an unidentified shooter killed an Israeli-American citizen near Jericho. Israeli and Palestinian Authority operations to locate Palestinian militants in the West Bank are ongoing, and additional Israeli settler and Palestinian reprisals are likely in the coming days.
The continuing violence is likely to put pressure on Jerusalem to abandon the deal reached in Al 'Aqabah. Israeli officials will probably regard the recent Palestinian attacks as justification acting unilaterally and without notice to the Palestinian Authority. HAMAS blamed the Israeli Government for the settler violence and warned of
unspecified consequences for policies supporting the building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Militant groups in the Gaza Strip are probably considering responding to Israeli-instigated violence by launching small-scale rocket attacks into Israel.
(Near East EU, 28 Feb)
FROM THE PRC IN 5G DECISION
(S//HCS-P//OC-USGOV/NF) JORDAN/CHINA/US: AMMAN FACING PRESSURE Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein, who is leading Jordan's 5G wireless technology effort, is wavering on Amman's assurance to Washington that its mobile network operators will not choose Huawei for their 5G networks, almost certainly because he is worried about the possibility of the PRC retaliating against Jordan's economy. In mid-February, Hussein said that while he and Jordanian King Abdallah II prefer to keep Huawei out of Jordan's 5G networks, Jordan needs financial assistance to close the gap between Huawei and a non-Huawei vendor.
(Near East EU, 28 Feb)


(TS//SI//OC/NF) SYRIA: ISIS SENIOR LEADER KILLED IN SYRIA
On 24 February, ISIS senior leader and global administrator Abu Sara was reportedly killed in Syria. Abu Sara led ISIS's General Directorate of Provinces and influenced its strategy, personnel assignments, and most sensitive global operations. J2 Assessment: Abu Sara's removal very likely will disrupt ISIS's global cohesion, security, and financial transfers for at least the next 3 months. ISIS likely will rely on its archived institutional knowledge and a new leadership cadre who lack extensive relationships with the group's legacy senior leaders.
(DIA Intel Update, 28 Feb)
RUSSIA, EUROPE, & EURASIA
(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) RUSSIA/MOLDOVA/TURKEY: PLANNING FOR DESTABILIZATION OF MOLDOVA CONTINUES
At least some figures behind Russian plotting against Moldova intend to continue their efforts despite recent public revelations about their activities. The general director of the Russian private military company Vegacy Strategy Services coordinated with an employee of Vagner- linked influence group, "The Farm," in mid-February to adjust their planning for likely
destabilization activities in Moldova.
The organizers originally planned to hold protest training in Turkey from 24 to 28 February but changed the location to an unspecified special training center in Russia because of travel restrictions and Turkish intelligence attention on Russian males. They also extended the total training time to one to two months.
The employees said that more than 150 participants would attend the protest training, which would include lessons on starting protests, security service reaction to riots, first aid, and psychological training for what to do if caught. (Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)
(S//NF) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: BATTLEFIELD UPDATE
Russian forces made minor territorial gains around Bakhmut yesterday and continued to press Ukrainian forces elsewhere in the region, even as Ukraine expanded its access to key supply lines running westward out of the city. Separately, Russia conducted one-way UAV attacks against targets near Kyiv and Zhytomyr-all of which Ukraine claimed it intercepted-and against a Ukrainian military unit in western Ukraine, which killed two and injured three. (Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)


Nigeria: INEC Announces Lead for Ruling Party Candidate, Continues Vote Counting (U//FOUO)
(U//FOUO) Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on 27 February continued counting votes from the 25 February presidential election and said so far ruling party candidate Bola Tinubu had won 3.8 million votes and six states, opposition candidate Atiku Abubakar had won 3 million votes and five states, and candidate Peter Obi had won 1.6 million votes and three states, according to an OSE report. Additionally, Tinubu publicly accepted his loss of Lagos State, where he had been governor from 1999 to 2007, to Obi.[1](EUW2023022805090399)
Israel, Palestinian Territories: Netanyahu Denies Settlement Freeze, Deploys More Troops to West Bank
(U//FOUO)
(U//FOUO) Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu on 27 February denied agreeing to pause settlement expansion in the West Bank despite a joint statement issued after a US-sponsored meeting between top Israeli and Palestinian officials on 26 ebruary in Jordan, according to an OSE report. Separately, Jerusalem on 27 February deployed additional troops to the est Bank after new unrest resulted in the deaths of two Israelis and one Palestinian, according to an OSE report. [2] W2023022765287144)[3] (IMW2023022774700345)
rael: Deputy Minister Resigns Over Failure To Uphold Coalition Agreements (U//FOUO)
UI/FOUO) Deputy Minister and head of the Noam Party Maoz on 27 February resigned in protest of Prime Minister Netanyahu's "failure to fulfill coalition agreements," according to an OSE report. Additionally, Maoz stated there was "no real intention" to uphold the coalition agreement regarding the Jewish National Identity Authority.[4]
(LIW2023022771195902)
Russia, Ukraine: Vagner Plans To Resume Prisoner Recruitment (TS//SI-G//OC/NF)
(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) Russian private military company Vagner in mid-February planned to resume its recruitment of convicts for Vagner units deployed to Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, Vagner owner Prigozhin wanted prisoners returning home to join the recruitment effort in place of recalled Ministry of Defense service members
previously tasked with recruiting prisoners. [11](3/00/121297-23)
Mali, Russia, Turkey: Vagner Seeks Weapons From Ankara (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
(TS//SW//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company Vagner personnel in early February met with Turkish intelligence report. Additionally, Malian Transition President Goita had confirmed that Mali could acquire weapons from contacts to purchase weapons and equipment from Turkey for Vagner's efforts in Mali and Ukraine, according to a signals
Turkey on Vagner's behalf.[5](3/00/121157-23)
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Russia: Abidjan Assesses Threat of Vagner Presence Across Border; Vagner
Strength in Mali Grows (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)


STOMER COmu
TOP SECRET//SI-GAMORCON/NOFORN/FISA
sabotage the offensive, noting that he promised to "the the so-called special military operation by 5 March, when Forces' capabilities were superior to Russia's and cautionedhat Russia would suffer heavy casualties were it to proceed that Gerasimov reportedly planned to continue his efforts to Putin was allegedly scheduled to start a round of chemothapy and would thus be unable to influence the war effort.
with the offensive. Bohutska on 22 February indicated t
(U) 3/00/122254-23
Russian MoD Provides Plan to Strike UAF (TS//SI-GI/O TO USA, FVEY) FLocations in Odesa, Mykolaiv for 3 March (UAF) locations in Odesa and Mykolaiv for 3 March. All of the (MoD) provided plans for the Combined Grouping of Troops to conduct missile strikes against Ukrainian Armed Forces ( (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian Ministry of Defense" strikes were to take place when the unit was ready and would utilize a weapon system to be decided by the commander. of an armored vehicle factory used to repair UAF armored self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system in between vehicles. The following additional locations were targeted in Odesa: an aviation factory used for storing and updating healthcare facilities; and a temporary deployment point for UAF "Pravyy Sektor" subunits reportedly containing up to 100 Ukrainian Tu-141 "Strizh" UAVS; an alleged location of
The location in Mykolaiv was a workshop
personnel.
(U) G/00/122643-23
on the grounds"
a
Gepard
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)
Russian GOU Provides Potential Targeting Information for Ukrainian Energy Infrastructure, Bridges information as of 28 February on 12 energy infrastructure facilities and 12 bridges in Ukraine, which would potentially be (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian 3rd Directorate, Main Operations Directorate (GOU) provided targeting struck on an unspecified date. The type of munitions to be used was unspecified. (COMMENT: The potential strikes were likely in the planning or approval process.) The potential targets provided were as follows: seven thermoelectric power plants near Shostka, Chernihiv, Sumy, Eskhar, Kamianske, Mykolaiv, and Odesa; five electric substations near Liubotyn, Krasnohrad, Lozova, Piatykhatky, and Kryvyi Rih; ten railroad bridges near Novomoskovsk, Balivka, Pidhorodne, Pavlohrad, Dnipro, Vasylkivka, and Zaporizhzhia; and two vehicle bridges near Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro.
(U) G/RG/122297-23
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)
Ukrainian President Suggests Striking Unspecified Russian Deployment Locations in Rostov, Russia (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in late February suggested striking Russian deployment locations in Russia's Rostov Oblast using UAVs. Zelenskyy on 28 February expressed concern to Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) Commander-in-Chief Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyy and an unidentified Ukrainian official that Ukraine does not have long-range missiles capable of reaching Russian troop deployments in Russia nor anything with which to attack them. He suggested that Ukraine attack unspecified deployment locations in Rostov with unspecified UAVS. Zaluzhnyy assessed that Ukraine could reach Tuapse, Russia-which Zelenskyy believed was unnecessary-and noted that, after Russian troops arrived in Rostov, they would be on the move. Zelenskyy added that the Russian forces were traveling to Avdiivka, Ukraine. The unidentified official calculated that the troops would arrive in Avdiivka as soon as 5 or 10 March. (According to BBC Monitoring on 28 February, local media reported that an oil facility in the southern Russian Black Sea port of Tuapse was slightly damaged by a fire following an apparent attack by UAVS. Local residents heard two explosions
seconds apart, after which a fire broke out.)
(U) G/00/122318-23
(TS//SI-G//OC/RELT
TO USA, FVEY)
Russia Devises Plans to Combat NATO Tanks Going to Ukraine Beginning April 2023 (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian General Staff and r NATO tanks that were expected to be delivered to Ukraine beginning in April. The strategy called for establishing three fire zones based on range-long, medium, and short-with each zone covered by specific weaponry and unit types. At the Ground Forces in February developed measures to combat same time, personnel training efforts would be administered to educate on the vulnerabilities of NATO tanks, and to develop morale and psychological fortitude within the personnel units confronting them. Financial incentives would be
Page 2 of 8
MMAL


(U//FOUO) The below information is current as of 1200 ET/1700Z.
(U) RUSSIA/UKRAINE
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
UAF in Bakhmut Almost Encircled; HUR Plans to Send in Elite Unit to Stabilize Catastrophic Situation (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Ukrainian forces as of 25 February were almost operationally encircled by Russian forces in Bakhmut, Ukraine and Ukrainian Main intelligence Directorate (HUR) Chairman Kyrylo Budanov on 28 February ordered that an elite HUR combat unit be deployed there for 2 weeks to stabilize what he considered a "catastrophic" situation. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Roman Mashovets on 25 February provided Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak with an update, which assessed that the situation in Bakhmut was rather difficult. According to Mashovets, there was only one UAF supply road to Bakhmut, which was subject to shelling, as well as a couple of foot crossings to the left bank of an unspecified river in Bakhmut. He asserted that the contested area had a "204.8 elevation" and that, if the Russian forces gained full control of it, then they would have almost the entire section west of Bakhmut and a direct line of sight to the UAF supply road. Also, if Russian forces were to take control of an unspecified filtration station, then the supply road would again be under a direct line of fire. Mashovets reported that, for those reasons, the morale in Bakhmut was low, with the Ukrainian forces under the impression that they were almost operationally encircled. Budanov on 28 February explained to UAF Ground Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyy, HUR First Deputy Chief Maj. Gen. Oleh Ivashchenko, and a HUR officer identified only as Vova that HUR would bring in units to Bakhmut for a brief time to stabilize the situation. Budanov later relayed to Vova that the situation in Bakhmut was "catastrophic" and Syrskyy declared a need for HUR's Kraken unit to prevent the UAF from losing Bakhmut. Also that day, Syrskyy asserted to Budanov that Ukrainian forces desperately needed to reach Yahidne, Ukraine because an unspecified road was the UAF's "last breathing tube." (COMMENT: This is possibly the supply road that Mashovets referenced.) Budanov ordered Vova to send one of "Shaman's" units to Bakhmut for no more than 2 weeks, instructing him to bring in only the unit's combat element and not its command post. (COMMENT: "Shaman" likely refers to the call sign for HUR officer Ihor Polonskyy. It is unclear if "Shaman's" unit and the Kraken unit are the same.) Vova criticized UAF leadership for insisting on sending a "combat element" to the front lines in Bakhmut without proper command and control, noting that the UAF needed clear control on the ground and that the Kraken unit has demonstrated that it has enough power and resources to establish it. (U) 3/00/122312-23
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
Ukraine Learns of Alleged Russian Plot to "Throw" So-Called Special Military Operation By 5 March (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak on 17 February learned of an alleged Russian plot to "throw" the so-called "special military operation," presumably in an attempt to sabotage Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) member Yelyzaveta Bohutska, who received the information from an unidentified Russian source with access to Kremlin officials, Russia planned to divert resources from Taganrog, Russia to Mariupol, Ukraine and focus its attention on the southern front. According to Bohutska's source, the plan for "the offensive" (no further information) was suspected to be a strategy devised by Russian National Securit


Set Tins
Impact-To
5.5 g (0.19
TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA
the Status of Women and return by 9 March in time for the afternoon session of the UN General Assembly; or leave New Graca added that the travel into Kyiv would be by either car York in the afternoon of 10 March and return on 14 March the possibilities of travel at this point and doing internal presented two travel scenarios for the trip: leave New York on 6 March after the opening of the annual Commission on or train, and emphasized that they were just looking groundwork without reaching out to any external entities or countries, including Ukraine.
(U) G/00/122293-23
at
(TS//SI//RELT
TO USA, FVEY)
Almost Certainly IAEA DG Upset About Probable UN Refusal of ZNPP Visit Amid Fighting (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials in mid-February shared that "he," almost certainly referring to IAEA Director-General (DG) Rafael Grossi, was upset over the reluctance of unidentified individuals, on the hesitancy. Grossi's Senior Adviser Diego Candano probably UN officials, to allow an IAEA mission to travel to or from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid Laris on 17 February disclosed to IAEA Chief of Cabinet Jacek Bylica that Candano received a map detailing battles in "the battles in the area and reportedly wanted to push back probably c area," probably referring to the area surrounding or along the route that the IAEA used to rotate inspectors to the ZNPP. justify why "no one" wanted to cross this area. According to Candano explained that the map was shared as a way to Candano, almost certainly Grossi explained that he did not understand the logic and believed that if Ukraine and Russia both guaranteed the route and voiced that they would not attack presumably the IAEA mission, then it should not matter if there was fighting happening. Candano revealed that almost certainly Grossi believed that the IAEA should be pushing back and that almost certainly Grossi was already "very upset." Bylica agreed with Candano and shared that there were a ot of people that were upset. However, Bylica alleged that the UN had not yet received a "positive message" in writing rom either of the countries, that the Russians' message was only made orally, and that the Russians had not responded
the UN.
3/00/122310-23
(TS//SI-G//OC/NF)
outh Korea Mired in End User Concerns Related to U.S. Push to Obtain Ammunition for Ukraine //SI-G//OC/NF) Yi Mun-hui, Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs at South Korea's National Security Office (NSO), 1 March informed NSO Director Kim Sung-han that the South Korean National Security Council (NSC) was mired in concerns that the U.S. would not be the end user if South Korea were to comply with a U.S. request for ammunition. The NSC reportedly was also worried that the U.S. President would call South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol directly. Yi stressed that South Korea was not prepared to have a call between the heads of state without having a clear position on the issue, adding that South Korea could not violate its policy against supplying lethal aid, so officially changing the policy would be the only option. Yi urged Kim to solicit the thoughts of Im Ki-hun, Secretary to the President for National Defense at the NSO, since Im pledged to determine a final stance by 2 March. Yi advised that Kim should then discuss the matter further with the NSC if it were still necessary. Kim expressed his concern over how the issue would be perceived domestically: if the announcement of Yoon's state visit to the U.S. were to coincide with an announcement that South Korea changed its stance on providing lethal aid to Ukraine, t the public would think the two had been done as a trade. Kim then suggested the possibility of selling the 330,000 rounds of 155-mm ammunition to Poland since getting the ammunition to Ukraine quickly was the ultimate goal of the t agree to being called the end user and send the ammunition on to Ukraine. Yi noted that the draft legislation on allowing advanced countries to be named as end users for arms exports was in the process of becoming law, but South Korea would
need to verify what Poland would do.
(U) Z-G/00/122198-23
(U) RUSSIA
United
States. Yi agreed that it may be possible for Poland to
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, CAN, GBR) Naval Forces Navigating Internal Channels of NSR (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, CAN, GBR) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in early February provided an assessment Russian MoD Concerned Over Potential NATO A discussing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the threat of U.S. and NATO military assets in the region. According to the
Page 4 of 8
MAI


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SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA
TOP offered for the capture or destruction of foreign tanks, and videos of tanks being destroyed would be widely distributed to reduce the confidence of Ukraine and the West and reassure Russian troops of their ability to overcome this new weaponry. The General Staff expected the proposed measures to undermine any desires by Ukrainian leadership to launch counterattacks, damage the image of NATO members that lend support due to the destruction or capture of their so- called modern tanks, and discourage the West from rendering additional assistance to Ukraine.
(U) G/00/122542-23
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)
Russian Armed Forces Tasked With Mine-Clearing Operations in Luhanska for Gazprom Pipeline (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian state energy conglomerate Gazprom officials in early February requested mine- clearing support from Russian Armed Forces for an area in Luhanska Oblast, Ukraine where they would be building a pipeline between different gas distribution networks. The Gazprom officials specified that the pipeline would be constructed between Raihorodka and Trokhizbenka. (COMMENT: Despite this projected location, additional coordinates and engineering reconnaissance reports detailed below indicate the area being cleared of mines is between Krymske and Trokhizbenka.) In response to the request from Gazprom officials, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) Chief of Engineering Forces was expected to have a proposal outlining the actions required to fulfill the request by 10 February. A Russian MoD official on 6 February reported results of engineering reconnaissance around the area of the projected pipeline, which was defined as an area between Trokhizbenka and Krymske. The overall inspection area consisted of 18 hectares, of which 7 hectares had already been cleared of mines as of 6 February, and was noted to contain hard-to- traverse areas because of plots containing dense vegetation. Preliminary reconnaissance revealed that there were mixed mine fields within the inspection area, specifically PMN and TM-62 mines. It was also specified that to properly conduct mine-clearing operations, a BMP-3M vehicle would need to be allocated. Additionally, an element from the 2nd Army Corps 36th Separate Engineering and Construction Battalion would be tasked with mine-clearing a reinforced concrete vehicle bridge over the Severskiy Donets River near Trokhizbenka.
(U) G/IT/122383-23
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)
Russia Reports Insufficient Personnel, Equipment Levels of Eastern GTF Subunits (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian National Defense Command Center in February disseminated a report on the decreased combat capability of military units operating under the Eastern Grouping of Troops (Forces) (GTF) due to an insufficient quantity of specialized personnel, functioning military equipment, weapons and ammunition as of 15 February. The Russian Federal Security Service Department for Military Counterintelligence reported security and munition storage protocol violations at field army warehouses within the 36" Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 29th Combined Arms Army that could possibly lead to incidents. Specifically, over-watch posts at the brigade's combat positions were not fully deployed, security for the field army warehouse was not assigned, fake warehouse positions were not equipped, and munitions storage locations were not camouflaged. Additionally, vehicles were not being inspected for explosives, man- made barriers with ground sensors for the most dangerous areas of the artillery warehouse were not installed, and artillery ammunition was being stored outside of its packaging in an open field.
(U) G/O0/122329-23
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
UNSG Considering Early March Travel to Ukraine to Meet With Ukrainian President (TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres and UN Office of the Secretary-General Director Miguel Graca on 28 February discussed the possibility of Guterres traveling to Ukraine in early March to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Guterres disclosed that Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak notified him that Zelenskyy wanted to speak with Guterres in person, which seemed to annoy Guterres. Nonetheless, Guterres wanted Graca to explore possible scenarios for a trip to Kyiv. While Guterres clearly was not happy about going to Kyiv, he asserted that if this was what it took to "disentangle the situation," then it was necessary to make the trip. Guterres instructed Graca to keep the possible trip confidential, and did not want the Ukrainians to know that the UN was exploring the possibilities of a trip there at that time. Shortly thereafter, Graca alerted Assistant Secretary- General for Department of Safety and Security Unaisi Lutu Vuniwaqa about Guterres's possible trip to Ukraine. He
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curious

Unread post by curious » 2023-5-18 19:59

Thank you I have been searching for ages


Last bumped by Anonymous on 2023-5-18 19:59.

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